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E-VERIFY:
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING
ANNOTATED TRANSCRIPT
PETER ASAAD: I’d like to welcome everyone to this informative program
entitled E-Verify and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.1 I’d like also to thank
our panelists for volunteering their time today and we would like to extend
our appreciation to American University Washington College of Law, the
Immigrants’ Rights Coalition, and the LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM
who put a lot of time and energy into organizing today’s panel.
Before we get started with our panelists, I will provide a brief history and
introduction to the topic.
For the first time ever, in 1986, Congress made it illegal for employers to
knowingly hire, recruit, or continue to employ undocumented workers through
the Immigration Reform and Control Act, otherwise known as IRCA.2 Since
1986, controlling illegal immigration by regulating who is entitled to work in
the United States has been a key component of the U.S. immigration policy.
For the first time, IRCA required all employers to examine documents to verify
their employees’ identity and citizenship or immigration status and to attest to
the verification on the paper-based I-9 form. President Reagan described the

1. In a 5-3 decision, with the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts,
the Court held that the Legal Arizona Workers Act—that provides for the suspension and/
or revocation of the business license of Arizona employers who knowingly or intentionally
employ unauthorized aliens—is not preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and
Control Act. Additionally, the Court held that Arizona’s requirement to mandate the usage
of the E-Verify system preempted federal law. 131 S. Ct. 624 (2011).
2. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359.
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I-9 provision3 as the keystone of IRCA in 1986.4
Under the paper-based I-9 scheme, the employee offers identity documents,
such as a driver’s license, and an employment eligibility document, such as
a social security card. The employer then looks at these documents, and the
employer is presumed safe if the documents reasonably appear authentic
on their face. This is the so-called good faith defense. The employer is then
in the clear unless there is evidence that the employer knowingly hired the
unauthorized worker.
In 1994, a unanimous recommendation was made by the bipartisan U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform to institute an electronic employment
verification system. Our panelist today, Representative Morrison, was on
that commission. It wasn’t until 1996 that a more mechanized system of
employment verification was introduced through the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, otherwise known as IIRIRA.5 But,
even then, the program was only authorized as a pilot program which, after one
year, became the Basic Pilot Program.
In 1997, the Basic Pilot Program allowed employers, on a voluntary basis
and only in five states, to electronically verify the work eligibility of a new
hire. Congress extended the program to all fifty states, but it continued on a
pilot and voluntary basis. Now, in 2007, the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) changed the name of the Basic Pilot Program to E-Verify, and, the
same year, the Office of Management and Budget instructed federal agencies
to utilize the E-Verify system for all new employees.
E-Verify is an Internet-based system designed as a tool for employers to
electronically verify employment eligibility. E-Verify is a complement to the
I-9 paperwork process; it doesn’t replace it. Specifically, E-Verify compares
employee information required by the I-9 form against more than 455 million
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) records, more than 122 million
Department of State passport records, and more than eighty million [DHS]
immigration records. So it’s pinging these databases to verify both identity and
employment eligibility, using the information that was put into the I-9 form
upon hire.

3. The I-9 is a paper-based form through which employees record identification
documents demonstrating employment eligibility. Employers must examine the
identification documents and keep records of compliance with the I-9 paper-based,
employment eligibility verification system. See Ariz. Contractors. Ass’n, Inc. v. Napolitano,
526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (D. Ariz. 2007).
4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.
Ct. 624 (2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/scotus10chamber1208.pdf (last visited July 28, 2011).
5. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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Expanding yet again, beginning September 8, 2009, federal contractors and
subcontractors became required to participate in E-Verify pursuant to federal
regulation.
Then in January 2008, Arizona enacted the Legal Arizona Workers Act,6
requiring all public and private employers to check the employment eligibility
of new employees through E-Verify. This Arizona law is the subject of current
litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court in a case entitled Chamber of
Commerce v. Whiting.7
Now, stepping back and looking at IRCA, Congress developed this as a
comprehensive scheme to prohibit unauthorized employment. Congress was
focusing on balancing at least three difficult problems: first, minimizing burdens
on the employer; second, minimizing discrimination against people who are
permitted to be hired—so this isn’t supposed to be a system that discriminates,
this is supposed to be a mechanism that eliminates discrimination; and third, it
is supposed to minimize the hiring of people who are not permitted to be hired.
The resulting IRCA scheme is a careful and delicate balance. It imposes
both a fine for illegal hiring and a fine for discrimination. The Legal Arizona
Workers Act provides that if an employer hires an unauthorized worker, the
employer loses its license to do business, instead of merely being fined.
As Justice Breyer noted during the U.S. Supreme Court oral argument
on June 8, 2010, that scheme amplifies the incentive to terminate those who
appear unauthorized to work because it’s actually silent as to the disincentive
to discriminate. He explains, “If you’re a businessman, every incentive under
that law is to call close questions against hiring this person.” In contrast, “[u]
nder the Federal law, every incentive is to look at it carefully [so as not to
discriminate].”8
The Legal Arizona Workers Act also requires businesses to use E-Verify,
and, if they fail to do so, they cannot receive any grants, loans, or performancebased incentives. As one of our panelists, Dr. Marc Rosenblum, explains in his
recent report on E-Verify,9 fourteen other states also require certain employees
in the state to be checked using E-Verify, including four states—Alabama,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Utah—which similar to Arizona, require all
employers to participate in E-Verify.
Mandatory use of E-Verify has been a subject of proposed federal legislation
for years. In 2005, a bill, passed in the House by a vote of 239 to 182,

6.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-212 (2011).
7.
Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010), cert. granted, 78
U.S.L.W. 3762 (U.S. Jun. 28, 2010) (No. 09-115).
8.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.
Ct. 624 (2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/scotus10chamber1208.pdf (last visited July 28, 2011).
9. MARC ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., E-VERIFY: STRENGTHS,
WEAKNESSES, AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2011).
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sought to make employment verification a requirement for all employers.10
Both major pieces of proposed legislation on comprehensive immigration
reform in 200611 and 200712 also contained provisions to mandate electronic
employment verification by employers. In addition to the mandatory use of
E-Verify, it was also the subject of the [Secure America Through Verification
and Enforcement Act ] (“SAVE”) Act,13 a bill in the 110th Congress that almost
garnered the requisite number of signatures for a successful discharge petition
in the House of Representatives. Finally, in the new Congress, leaders in the
new Republican majority have actively voiced their interest in making E-Verify
mandatory for all employers.
It is becoming clear that the expansion or mandatory use of E-Verify is
potentially on the horizon. Our panelists today will not only help us understand
the legal battle currently before the Supreme Court in Chamber of Commerce
v. Whiting, but also help us understand the policy implications of any
expansion of the use of E-Verify. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting represents
the possibility that states and even local municipalities may have the ability
to make E-Verify mandatory for employers in their jurisdiction—creating a
patchwork of rules nationwide. Some states require E-Verify, whereas other
states may not.
Furthermore, statements by Representative Gallegly, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee’s Immigration Panel, and many other Republicans
as well as many Democrats and Obama Administration officials, represent a
willingness to make E-Verify mandatory. So we’re looking at both what’s
happening in the Supreme Court and what could happen in the states as well
as on the federal level.
First, there is the issue of effectiveness, which our panelists will speak
of, in catching unauthorized workers. Independent analyses of the E-Verify
program by the Government Accountability Office and a Maryland research
group known as Westat shows that if an unauthorized worker presents genuine
identity and employment eligibility documents that are borrowed or stolen,
E-Verify will erroneously confirm them as an authorized worker. The report
estimated, in 2009, that fifty-four percent of unauthorized workers screened
through E-Verify were erroneously approved as work authorized. That means
that E-Verify failed to do the job it is intended to do more than half the time.

10. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control of 2005, H.R.
4437, 109th Cong. (2005).
11. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006).
12. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007).
13. Secure America Through Verification and Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R. 3308,
111th Cong. (2009).
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Now the supporters of E-Verify will say, “Well, so it’s not perfect. So what?
At least it does something. At least it catches some of them.” Well, there’s
another issue that our panelists will discuss, which is the harm it does to
lawful workers. The mandatory use of E-Verify does not mean employment
authorization inquiries are only for foreign workers. When it’s mandatory, it’s
mandatory for all workers. Obviously you can’t decide who’s the worker that
you’re going to check. It’s a check on all workers.
Thus, a federally commissioned study of E-Verify14 showed that over
ninety-six percent of workers queried through E-Verify were approved as
authorized workers. However, while E-Verify’s accuracy rates have increased,
the [DHS] and Social Security Administration databases, upon which E-Verify
relies, contain errors. So how do those errors affect U.S. workers? Well,
for example, workers who naturalize through marriage or have multiple or
hyphenated surnames may receive erroneous results from E-Verify. When
problems are found, employers are required, to notify workers of a tentative
nonconfirmation, known as a “TNC,” and give the employee an opportunity to
contest the initial finding.
The Westat report finds that 0.8 percent of authorized workers were shown
to be unauthorized. So authorized workers were shown to be unauthorized.
Another report by Los Angeles County15 showed that error rate to be as high as
2.7 percent. But let’s say that if it’s made mandatory, even if the error rate were
only one percent, that would be one percent of 163 million, if we’re looking at
163 million workers in the United States. Well, 1.6 million authorized workers
would be unable to work until they could verify their work authorization status.
More troubling is the incentive to terminate that Justice Breyer mentioned,
under the Arizona Legal Workers Act. A survey of immigrant workers in
Arizona found that 33.5 percent of those found tentatively unconfirmed
initially through the system, had been unlawfully fired. They weren’t given
the chance to correct their tentative nonconfirmation; to fix the database; to
say, “I’ve changed my name since I was married.” And as a result, if we look
at whether it’s made mandatory with an error rate of one percent of authorized
workers shown to be unauthorized and if a third are terminated without being
notified of the tentative nonconfirmation to contest and seek corrections to
those databases, we’re looking at over 536,000 work authorized people per
year who will lose their jobs. You can extrapolate that there will be that type of
discrimination that authorized workers will lose their jobs.

14. WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE E-VERIFY® PROGRAM EVALUATION (2009), http://
www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final%20E-Verify%20 Report%2012-16-09_2.
pdf (last visited August 18, 2011).
15. COAL. FOR HUMANE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS OF LOS ANGELES, ANALYSIS: E-VERIFY
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY (2009), http://www.chirla.org/sites/default/files/E-Verify.pdf.
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Third, there’s a financial cost which I will let our guests speak on—for
example, Bloomberg News Service said that making E-Verify mandatory
would cost $2.7 billion a year and would also burden businesses.16 There’s the
issue of prescreening—using E-Verify before someone is even employed—
which raises issues as well, which our guests will speak of. Some businesses
lack the resources to even use E-Verify.
Then, there’s the elephant in the room. I-9 is a compliance mechanism.
E-Verify is also a compliance mechanism, but somewhere along the way, it
became confused with a deportation strategy. Calls for mandatory E-Verify
tend to portray the program as the solution to our illegal immigration problem
and a way to generate jobs for unemployed Americans. The elephant in the
room is that significant portions of the U.S. economy depend on documented,
immigrant, foreign labor. Not only that, but looking at E-Verify as becoming
mandatory, individuals are focused on it as the solution to the immigration
problem without looking at comprehensive immigration reform and
understanding the needs of our employers.
CONGRESSMAN MORRISON: First of all, thank you all for coming.
It’s a pleasure to have a chance to talk to people who may get to resolve this
problem in their professional careers. I’ve been working on it for twenty-five
years and we’re not there yet, so we probably have plenty to do in this field—if
you’re interested in it.
I’d like to suggest that it’s very important to put this discussion in a context,
and the context is, how does the United States operate a successful legal
immigration regime that has credibility with the American people? I think I’m
the only person on this panel who has ever actually had to vote on legislation
generally, and legislation in this area, and so I bring to this discussion the
perspective of the people who have to be persuaded about what the right thing
to do is about these difficult questions. And I think it’s very important, if you
believe in immigration as a central part of the American story, that we need to
find a way to have that be something that has credibility and support among
Americans.
And everybody is against illegal immigration. The issue isn’t whether we
should have a system that is not conforming to law, the challenge is how to
you actually have a system that operates within legal standards and is not beset
by the problem we currently have with so many millions of people here on an
unauthorized basis.
Some people want to use this debate about E-Verify to advance the undoing
of the mistakes of the past, undoing the fact that there are eleven million people
here illegally and that somehow, there’s some technological fix that’s going
to fix that. I think that’s wrong-headed. What we can do, however, is create a
16. Jason Arvello, ‘Free’ E-Verify May Cost Small Businesses $2.6 billion: Insight,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 28, 2011.
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legally-conforming future, and that’s really what this discussion ought to be
about—how we do that.
Now there really is no new policy being debated here. Congress, in 1986, set
a policy that still appeals to people on an intellectual level of what you have to
do if you are interested in preventing people from coming to the United States
in substantial numbers and remaining illegally, whether they entered legally or
they entered illegally. That is, most people who come here illegally initially or
who come legally and overstay either, initially have the intention of coming
here to work or, in order to stay here without legal status, have to work; so that
employment is at the center of the sustenance of any substantial population of
people who are unauthorized.
That’s what Congress decided in 1986, that if there was going to be a
legal regime—and at that point, we were debating two million, three million,
whatever number you wanted to accept—with two or three million people
present in the United States on an unauthorized basis. Obviously, measured
that way, the 1986 law was a total failure. But the idea at the center of it
was that this isn’t a border problem—you can only do a certain amount at the
border—but this is a workplace problem and, if you’re serious about it, you’ve
got to deal with the workplace.
I don’t think anything’s changed about that policy decision. What we’re
debating is how to do something at the workplace, and there are no easy and
simpleminded solutions because, if there were, even with all our political
problems as a country, we would have done them. We’ve thrown billions of
dollars at this problem and I don’t know how many trees have been sacrificed
in pursuit of the debate, but we are not much closer to a solution than we were
in 1986.
So 1986, to me, is the time when we got the policy right and the twenty-five
years in between is when we’ve gotten the implementation wrong. So, it’s in
that perspective that I think you should think about this and not get too hung
up in all the technical arguments without answering this question: how do
we solve this problem? Because, if we do not have a way to prevent people
from being employed if they’re unauthorized, then there will be millions of
unauthorized people here. It’s a simple economic fact. The border will be
breached in many ways. Many of the people who are here unauthorized came
legally and then overstayed. It isn’t a problem that’s going to be solved at the
border. It’s a problem that is either going to be solved at the workplace or not
at all.
And that really is the question that people have to struggle with; how much
burden and on whom are we willing to accept at the workplace, in order to
prevent the presence of large numbers of unauthorized workers? It is a very
simple question to state and a very hard question to resolve. And most of
what you hear in the discussion of all the technicalities of E-Verify tend,
sometimes, to obscure that fundamental question, because that’s the choice.
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The other thing I’d say, putting it in context, is there are a lot of people
in Congress who will feel themselves politically better off for voting for an
expansion of E-Verify or a mandatory E-Verify without regard to all of the
niceties that you’ll hear discussed on this panel about fixing this or fixing that.
The political momentum is in favor of enforcement. Billions on the border,
much of it wasted; billions for the workplace, much of it wasted. The politics
are pushing away from a rational solution to this problem, a careful solution
to this problem. The longer this is a debate and not a kind of problem-solving
implementation, the more likely that we’ll just get all of the downsides and
miss the upsides, as we did in 1986.
So, I have just a few other observations. First, I’d like to talk about the
workplace initiative as a prevention strategy. I think when it’s talked about
as enforcement, it gets confused about what is the objective. In my opinion,
the objective is not to use a worksite program to get rid of the eleven million
people already here. The question of what to do about the eleven million people
is really a separate policy judgment. I have my opinions on that, but that’s not
the purpose of this discussion.
If you see the worksite prevention being confused with fixing the problem
that we created over the last twenty-five years, well you’re never going to get
any agreement on preventing what might happen in the future. And I actually
think the American people are very open to some reasonable resolution of the
mistaken eleven million if they can believe that the future is not the creation
of a new eleven million. So I think it’s very important to think in prevention
terms.
If you think in prevention terms, the last thing you would ever do—which
is something that the Bush and Obama Administrations did—is to go back
and check existing employees. Because once you go back there, you’ve really
changed this from a preventing the incentive to come and get a new job into
some kind of prior enforcement regime, and that was done in the contractor
regulation. Despite the litigation, which was unsuccessful, the 1986 law forbids
the use of the current I-9 E-Verify scheme to get at existing employees, but it’s
the law now for federal contractors.
So prevention is important. Let’s think about how this becomes a
disincentive to come in the future. No system screening people at the worksite
will be perfect, number one. And any system will make it more attractive to be
employed off the books. So there’s two parts to this problem. The one part is
the compliant employer. Most employers are compliant. They obey laws that
they don’t agree with everyday. Most employers just follow the law because
that’s the way to do business. Obviously, publicly-traded corporations are at
great risk for violating the law, but most business people obey the law; they
withhold the taxes, they send the taxes in, etc. They may or may not agree
with it. So there’s a compliant community. And then there’s a noncompliant
community. We can argue about how big the two of them are, but I think the
first is much bigger than the second.
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But there is now and there will be, during any enforcement regime, any
prevention regime, an off-the-books problem. There’s an off-the-books
problem right now with American citizens, without regard to people who are
unauthorized to work. If we’re serious about this problem and some other
problems, we should have a much increased focus on enforcing labor laws
and insisting on on-the-books employment throughout our economy. We don’t
even enforce the wages and hours laws effectively right now.
So that’s a part of this, and anybody who wants any of this to work needs to
recognize this. The Joint Tax Committee said it would cost seventeen billion
dollars over ten years if you made E-Verify mandatory, and the reason for that
number they said was a number of taxpayers would go off the books. Whether
that number is right or not, it’s directionally correct; that is, you will get more
of it. Now finally, just a few things about E-Verify itself.
My colleague Paul Donnelly, who’s here, and I have been working on
this going back to the Jordan Commission. He was also a staff member
of mine when I was in Congress and [assisted with] the 1990 Act.
So we’re old and gray and rather cranky about the subject. But we found the
Westat report in plain sight on the DHS website. Nobody was talking about
it and everybody was talking about false negatives; that is, people who are
misidentified as unauthorized, which is a number that has been shrinking. But
what we found really interesting in the Westat report were false positives. The
fact that, essentially, over half the time, a person who is not authorized could
be found to be authorized because of impostor documents. And that’s like
flipping a coin.
So the whole point of this system is not to catch American citizens. The
whole point of this is to prevent employment of people who are not authorized.
So, if half the time that group is misidentified, then this system is failing. And
it won’t succeed unless, in some fashion, the identity of people is actually
verified, as opposed to numbers that they give or documents they present. I-9
is a document system. E-Verify is a number and document system. It is easy to
get impostor documents and an impostor identity and beat this system. When
the Swift Meatpacking Company was raided, they had about 6,000 employees;
1,300 of their employees, all of whom had been run through E-Verify, were
carted off as unauthorized. This is a serious problem, and hiding from this
problem won’t get us a solution.
So the impostor problem is very serious and the problems of what it takes to
verify identity are full of trade-offs between privacy and prevention. And you
can get into a long discussion about all of those, but I think, at the end of the
day, we either are going to solve those problems in some way or we’re going
to give up on it, and then we’re going to have lots of people here unauthorized,
plain and simple. Some people think if you have enough legal visas, that you’ll
solve the problem. But the fact is, illegal employment is always cheaper than
legal employment, so there’ll still be a lot of incentives in the economic system
if you don’t have any enforcement on the worksite end.
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Two final things. One, paper raids—which is the new, humane Obama plan
instead of real raids—actually is the biggest breeder of going out and getting
impostor documents you could ever imagine. People are being fired for having
inadequate documents. Where do you think they go next? To buy impostor
documents from the black market that provides them. So, this problem is being
made worse, not better, by paper raids, although they’re more humane, for
sure.
And then, finally, with respect to how we’re going to get at this problem,
I think that the scariest thing we might do is to spend billions more dollars
expanding E-Verify without solving the identity problem and the other tradeoffs that have to be met. But the Supreme Court is going to decide this question
as to whether the states can go ahead and the states are going ahead, and they
will continue to go ahead. Now, Arizona was very smart in what it did in this
piece of legislation. And no other state has actually done exactly what it did.
Arizona took the 1986 law, which has a very specific exemption to preemption
having to do with business licenses, and they took that language and made that
the centerpiece of its requirement that E-Verify and other verification be done.
Whether the Supreme Court will find that it is enough to overcome other
arguments about preemption or not, I won’t try to guess. But the reason that
the law passed muster in the Ninth Circuit was because of that very clever
drafting. And if that’s upheld, then I predict that many states in the country
will pursue that, and some people have said, “Well, losing a business license is
capital punishment, so that clearly can’t be compared to a fine.” But Congress
may have opened the door to that by the language employed in 1986, so that’s
a very interesting question to watch. But the people who drafted this were not
stupid. They knew exactly the channel they were trying to drive through.
PETER ASAAD: Now we turn to Dr. Marc Rosenblum.
DR. ROSENBLUM: Well, thank you for coming, everybody and including
me on this prestigious panel. It’s a tough act to follow and an honor to follow
Congressman Morrison. But I’ll reiterate a couple of points and maybe expand
on a couple of points. I’ll also tell you that I brought copies of my recent
E-Verify report and it’s back on the back table, so please pick that up.
Let me first, to reiterate, tell you that this program has been around since
1997. It’s really only been in use since 2005. In 2005, there were still just
5,000 employers using the system. But it’s grown exponentially, as in literally
exponentially; it’s doubled every year since 2005. And currently, there are
200,000 participating employers, which is about four percent of all employers
in the country, and about fourteen million verifications were run last year,
which is about a quarter of all hires in a typical year.
So that exponential growth means that most of what we know about
E-Verify is based on very recent experience, and we don’t still know exactly
how the system works, partly because most of this growth has occurred during
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the recent economic downturn. So, we still have a lot to learn as this program
continues to expand in terms of how it affects labor markets and hiring. And
certainly, we don’t know how it would work in the context of a different
immigration system that did a better job with matching supply and demand.
Although, certainly there’s no perfect way to do that, and you’ll always have
compliant employers and non-compliant employers.
But, I agree that it’s very important as we think about how to make E-Verify
work and how to put it in the context of the broader immigration debate,
to have in mind these two different populations of employers; the majority
of employers who intend to comply and then a subset of employers who
knowingly—or at least suspect that they’re hiring unauthorized workers. And,
there are employers now who do that in the I-9 context, and there are employers
in mandatory E-Verify states who knowingly, or more or less knowingly, hire
unauthorized workers because they feel unable to find U.S. workers or because
they prefer to hire unauthorized workers since they can pay them less for a
variety of reasons.
Designing a system that makes it easy for willingly-compliant employers
to comply accurately is a different task than designing a system to prevent
willfully-noncompliant employers from finding a way around the system. And
clever employers, with office workers who are looking for employment, have
a lot of resources to look for ways around the system. So it’s really different
tasks going after those two different problems.
I believe that E-Verify is a very powerful and important tool to build on the
I-9 process and to address what we know is the big flaw in the I-9 system, which
is that the I-9 system is a document-based system and it is very vulnerable to
document fraud. The employer has the responsibility to look and see if identity
documents on their face are genuine and prove work eligibility. Anybody can
go down to the flea market and buy a fake ID that looks genuine on its face,
so E-Verify was designed to prevent a certain type of fake ID by making sure
that the name and the number on the ID match data in DHS and Social Security
databases.
Looking at the data that DHS has made available, E-Verify probably
prevented about 166,000, unauthorized workers from obtaining employment
in 2009 by successfully non-confirming fake IDs. But there are two different
vulnerabilities. One is that while E-Verify can identify fake IDs that don’t have
a genuine name and number on them, it’s vulnerable to identity fraud when an
unauthorized worker uses a borrowed ID or a stolen ID or a fake ID that has a
real name and number on it that are available on the black market.
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The system has almost no mechanism designed to prevent this. There are a
couple of tools that USCIS17 has been experimenting with to try to cut down
on identity fraud, but for the most part, there is no defense against it right now
in E-Verify. The one defense that exists on a small scale is that for certain
types of IDs, USCIS has a photo-matching tool, which means that if you use
a green card or a passport or an employment authorization document as your
identity document and you’re using E-Verify, then the employer, in addition
to getting the confirmation that the name and number are in the database, will
also get a copy of the picture that’s on the original ID that was issued and the
employer can then match that picture to the ID that they’re presented with and
make sure that it’s not a fake ID with a real number on it and somebody else’s
picture. But only about two percent of hiring uses those documents. Most
hiring uses driver’s licenses to prove identity. So the identity fraud issue is
one vulnerability and the off-the-books employment is the other vulnerability.
With employers who intend to comply, they are vulnerable to being victims
of the identity fraud problem. And so what that means is that employers who
use E-Verify and are doing their best have no guarantee that they have a legal
workforce. And that’s a major disincentive to employers to take on the hassle
of using E-Verify because, even if you do everything right, you may not have
a legal workforce. And so employers really don’t get anything out of using
E-Verify. They don’t get a legal safe harbor and if [Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement]18 does an audit, they may lose their whole workforce. So there’s
really nothing in it for employers right now.
The off-the-books problem and the identity fraud problem is also an issue
for willfully-noncompliant employers because employers can conspire with
workers to use identity fraud in a variety of ways and they can just either
employ their workers off the books or use E-Verify selectively for some
workers and not others or just not use E-Verify even though they’re required
to do so.

17. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) is the government agency
that oversees lawful immigration to the United States. See About Us, USCIS, http://www.
uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2
af29c7755cb90 10VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=2af29c7755cb9010
VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD.
18. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is the principal investigative
arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. See ICE Overview, ICE, http://www.
ice.gov/about/overview/.
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As it has been pointed out, [the Congressional Budget Office]19 estimates
that requiring all employers to use E-Verify without creating an opportunity to
legalize their workforce would result in seventeen billion dollars in lost taxes
over ten years as a result of existing workers being moved off the books or
workers who would be hired on the books being hired off the books instead.
There are limits to E-Verify’s ability to do its job. The other point that Peter
referred to is that the system also sometimes non-confirms legal workers, and
we estimate that happens about one percent of the time; being 0.8 and 2.0
percent of the time—depending on what survey you look at. If all employers
were required to screen all new hires, that would be about between 600,000
and 1.2 million workers a year, legal workers who would be wrongly nonconfirmed. And between 60,000 and 280,000 workers would lose their jobs or
lose some period of employment or somehow face adverse consequences from
their employer during that period.
But the other issue with those false non-confirmations is that it creates a
lot of uncertainty for employers during the hiring process. In that one to two
percent of the time, employers by law have to treat all non-confirmations as
tentative non-confirmations and keep workers on the books, treating them as
if they were legal workers until workers are given the opportunity to correct
those errors. That raises the cost of using the system for employers because
most of the time, those workers end up being non-confirmed.
Therefore, to be compliant, employers have to keep workers on their
payrolls and train them even though they end up getting non-confirmed.
So, it increases the cost of using the system pretty significantly in those
cases of non-confirmation. And even though most U.S. workers, most
legal workers, are immediately confirmed, about a quarter of the time that
people are non-confirmed, those are mistakes. So, it’s a significant number
and would be a much more significant number in a universal system.
As we think about expanding E-Verify, let me just make a couple of points.
One is that all of the problems that exist—identity fraud, identity theft, workers
having adverse consequences—all these problems will not only increase
absolutely as the system gets bigger but also proportionally, and the reason is
that, in a mostly voluntary system like we have now, most E-Verify users are
federal contractors and/or large firms.
Nationwide, about ninety percent of employers are small firms with fewer
than twenty employees; only about thirty percent of E-Verify users have fewer
than twenty employees. So, almost all of the growth that we have ahead of us is
among small firms who have less internet access [and] smaller [human resource
(“HR”)] departments. Using E-Verify and using it correctly is a much larger

19. The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) is charged with providing nonpartisan
analyses to aid in federal budget decision-making and the Congressional budget process.
See About CBO, CBO, http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/.
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expense for these small firms than it is for large firms with HR departments
who still struggle to use it correctly. So it’s quite likely that existing error rates
and existing noncompliance rates will increase as a different demographic of
employers are required to use the system. That’s one point.
A second point I want to make is that the photo-matching tool that USCIS
uses and the other major innovation that USCIS has implemented in the last
few years, which is its own sort of electronic auditing of employers to look
for cases of employer misuse and to look for identity fraud, have limited
ability to address these weaknesses in the system and misuse by employers
through electronic monitoring and through existing photo-matching tools. And
basically, the reason is that most off-the-books employment and most identity
fraud don’t show up through long-distance electronic auditing. There’s no sort
of footprint in the electronic record that shows if you’re selectively screening
your workers. We don’t have that sophisticated of an electronic monitoring
tool.
It goes very much to the point that [Congressman] Morrison raised of who
is going to bear the costs of making this system work. Because, anything that
we do to prevent false confirmations, to make sure that the system does a better
job of preventing unauthorized employment, must create additional costs for
employers, and, especially, must create additional costs for legal workers. And
the likeliest tool, or one of the tools that we might think about to do that is to
create a biometric system. A biometric system would be much less vulnerable
to identity fraud, but the way we would—the steps we’d have to take to create
a biometric system—include all U.S. citizens and all legal workers would have
to give their biometrics to the government to create a biometric database that
could check against and all employers would have to capture biometrics when
they hire somebody. So, they’d have to have fingerprint-scanning technology
at the worksites or use subcontractors who are going to do that scanning, which
raises liability issues.
But, in any event, this is a major expansion beyond what E-Verify does now.
But those are the kinds of who bears the costs of fixing the system questions
that we have to raise as we think about, especially if we think about using this
as an enforcement tool rather than sort of a compliance tool.
So let me just finally mention that having raised this issue of biometrics and
the costs associated with biometrics, I also want to put in a pitch for a couple
of pilot programs that USCIS is initiating that I think should be explored as
alternatives to biometrics and as alternative strategies for strengthening this
system. And one of them is further expansion of the photo-matching tool to
include state drivers licenses. To do that likely would require congressional
action to mandate that states participate, and the debate over the Real ID Act20
has shown how difficult that is. But that would be a powerful tool to help

20.

REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005).
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employers who want to comply do so successfully. It’s not going to do anything
against the intentionally noncompliant employers but a powerful potential tool
for employers who intend to comply.
And then the other tool that I think is quite important is a self-check tool
which would allow workers to check their own E-Verify records and to
confirm themselves in the system before they go to get employment. This
is an important tool because it should—for workers who use this—greatly
reduce false non-confirmations and employer misuse of the system or the
consequences of employer misuse of the system. But it’s also potentially a
powerful anti-fraud tool because, although this is not how USCIS is piloting it
initially, in principle, it creates the opportunity for workers to lock their own
social security numbers and to prevent people from using their number without
their knowledge. So I think it’s potentially a way to substantially reduce fraud
without having to resort to biometrics, which may be desirable both from a
cost perspective and from privacy and civil liberties perspectives.
PETER ASAAD: Miss Tulli, your organization has produced several reports
highlighting many of the concerns raised in our panel discussion today. And
to prevent reiteration of that same discussion, I wanted to ask more about a
report that your organization produced, about how errors in E-Verify databases
impact U.S. citizens and lawfully-present immigrants. There are cases cited
where authorized workers, lawful permanent residents and U.S. citizens, had
difficulty clarifying denials of work authorization under E-Verify. Can you
discuss with us some of these cases you and others have seen at [the National
Immigration Law Center (“NILC”)]21 and how they were handled? Can you
walk us through the path to the resolution where they ultimately resolved?
How long did it take? What was the cost to the employers?
EMILY TULLI: As Peter mentioned, at NILC we have a policy advocacy
wing but we also provide technical assistance to worker advocates and workers
who are going through a variety of immigrant and workplace-related issues
and specifically with E-Verify.
I think it may be useful to ground our discussion today a little bit in a real
worker’s saga. So, I’m just going to talk a little bit about Jessica. She was
born and raised in Florida, and she took a job at a major telecommunications
company in Florida [during the] fall of this year. And as we think through her
story, I think it’s useful to consider—as the panelists have set up for us—if
E-Verify was to become mandatory and all workers were input into this system.
So, as we all do, she began employment there; she filled out typical I-9
paperwork, and her employer ran her through E-Verify. She wasn’t aware of
what she was being run through. They ran her through the system—that’s what
21. About Us, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., http://www.nilc.org/nilcinfo/index.
htm (last visited July 28, 2011).
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they told her. And, after a day of work, they came back to her and said, “You’re
showing up as not authorized to work. You need to go and resolve this.” And
she was confused—[she was] born and raised in Florida.
So, as a first step, she went home, and she got some more vital documents,
identity documents, and brought them back to her employer to try and resolve it.
Well, that didn’t work so the employer issued her a tentative nonconfirmation,
as they’re supposed to under the program rules, and she went to her local
Social Security office to try and resolve the issue.
Now, when she went to her local Social Security office—and remember,
she’s taking unpaid time, at this point, so she’s not working; she’s an hourly,
low-wage worker. [The Social Security Administration (“SSA”)] is open in her
area between 9:00 [a.m.] and 4:00 [p.m.], so she had to go during those hours.
And Social Security inputs her information and says, “You’re fine. We can see
here that you’re work authorized. Go back to your employer. They’ve made a
mistake.” So she’s now excited. She goes back to her employer, being told by
the SSA that she’s work authorized, which she knew, and the employer tells
her, “Nope, you’re still not coming up in our system;” again, not specifying the
system, not giving her any information.
At this point, she’s beside herself. She’s frantic. She had been unemployed
before she got this job. So she decides to start Googling and she calls legal
services organizations in Florida. After talking to an attorney at a legal services
organization, they sent her to the regional [Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”)] office. So everybody here knows that EEOC is most
likely not going to have jurisdiction over E-Verify issues in this sense. But she
very dutifully goes to the EEOC office to try and resolve the complaint and at
this point she’s been issued that [f that people are talking about. So as she’s
trying to resolve it, she couldn’t resolve it within the seven days; now she has
that final nonconfirmation, she’s been terminated.
At the EEOC, they listened very patiently and told her, “Well, you don’t
have a discrimination claim but maybe you should call E-Verify.” This is the
first time this worker who has been fired has heard the word E-Verify and
knows anything about it. It’s from the EEOC, which doesn’t have jurisdiction
over her claim.
So she went online and she called a USCIS hotline number. Again, she called
that hotline number between 9:00 [a.m.] and 5:00 [p.m.] because that’s when
they’re available and, luckily, she speaks English. At this point, the hotline
is only available in English and Spanish, so if she spoke another language
it would be difficult to get some help. She waits on the line for over an hour
and then finally talks to a representative and what do they tell her? “Well,
you’re in our system fine. You’re work authorized. Go back to your employer,
who you’ve now been terminated from, and just tell them that you’re work
authorized. We can see here that you’re work authorized.”
So she says, “OK, great. This is exciting. USCIS is telling me that they have
me in their system. This is going to be fixed. Can you send me a piece of paper
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indicating that, that I can then take to my employer?” “No, we can’t do that.”
Though USCIS does offer to call the employer. And USCIS calls her employer
and tries to work it out.
Now in this interim, it took about a week of USCIS talking to her employer;
her following up with the employer and the employer still saying, “We can’t
figure out what the problem is. We know USCIS is calling us. We understand.
We can’t figure out what the problem is.” In the interim of this period, when
she’s not hearing back, she starts job searching. And I probably didn’t do a
great job laying out the timeline but she was unemployed from the time she
received the FNC and was terminated until she found another position, not at
this employer. She was unemployed for three months. She decides that she’s
just not going to go back to the employer. Whether they can figure it out with
USCIS or not, she doesn’t want to go back because they use E-Verify and she
doesn’t want to have to go through that again. So at that point, she’s now taken
another position. The USCIS and her original employer, the telecommunications
company, have figured out what the problem was and now they’re willing to
take her on now that she’s gotten another position which, of course, is for
two dollars less an hour. I think that is a really sort of compelling narrative
and I think what’s important to underscore is that Jessica, who I’ve talked to
numerous times, is actually incredibly capable. She’s young, she’s Internet
savvy, she is culturally competent. She’s not a work-authorized immigrant
worker; she was born in this country, so she has some understanding of how
U.S. government works. She has a family who supported her. So for her, three
months without employment didn’t mean an eviction, utilities off, all those
other things that come with the reality of working in a low-wage industry; but
instead, she had a family that could support her, provide her with a space to
live.
JON FEERE: What was the error?
EMILY TULLI: The error was actually on the employer’s part. [She had]
a two-part last name and they were putting two spaces instead of one space
between the name, and that caused the non-confirmation.
JON FEERE: And that was an employer who tried to do everything right
and help the worker, and that’s the other thing that doesn’t always work right.
EMILY TULLI: Yes.
PETER ASAAD: And this is a story about a non-savvy, if you will,
employee who doesn’t understand the ins and outs of the system. But there’s
also the story of Traci Hong, who is—who’s been on the House Immigration
Subcommittee for several years. And when she was first hired, there was a
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requirement of all federal government employees to go through E-Verify. Well,
she certainly knows the ins and outs more than just about any of us, but there
was a mismatch. I’m sure Marc knows a little bit more about this. There was a
mismatch in her case and it took her quite some time and quite some difficulty
to go through that system and fix the database error.
But I just want to proceed a little bit to Mr. Feere. Your organization, the
Center for Immigration Studies,22 has produced reports showing the benefits
of E-Verify and it’s really important to understand those arguments. Would
you provide us some of those conclusions; why your organization has reached
those conclusions?
JON FEERE: Alright. Well, first off, let me just say I might be the only
panelist up here who can say that my organization uses E-Verify. I don’t
know if any of you guys do, but we do. We’re a small nonprofit and, like all
nonprofits, we’re always pinching pennies to make sure that we can maintain
our staff. And despite what some opponents of E-Verify say, it hasn’t been
some sort of financial disaster. We aren’t closing up shop because of E-Verify.
It’s very straightforward, our manager has no problem with it, and it’s working
to make sure that anyone who’s in our office is legally employable.
Couple of things I wanted to mention as far as statistics go. Right now, about
a thousand businesses sign up for it every week, some willingly, some because
they’re in a state that requires it. And from the research we can see, it means that
over one out of every four new hires actually is run through E-Verify. Ninetynine percent of eligible workers are confirmed to work instantaneously; three
to five seconds you get a response back. Fewer than one percent of eligible
workers need to update their records to be confirmed. Certainly there are still
some errors in the system. As you mentioned before, if you had changed your
last name or if the employer screwed up, then certainly it has to be corrected.
But for the most part, things are correct. We just heard the example of the
staffer; she was able to correct it.
Now we do view this as part of the solution to illegal immigration, as did the
commissions in the [19]90’s. And if we go back to 1986, when we had the first
large-scale, comprehensive amnesty bill, the bill was sold as a two-part deal;
it was legalization for those were here illegally and it was also the promise of
future enforcement of immigration laws. It also, as we heard, criminalized the
hiring of illegal immigrants.

22. About CIS, THE CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, http://www.cis.org/About (last
visited July 28, 2011).
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Well it wasn’t until a decade or so later that we finally were provided some
opportunity to determine whether or not their employees—or their potential
employees—were legally authorized to work and that was what eventually
became the E-Verify system. And what concerns us is that here we are now,
twenty-five years later—a quarter of a century out from the 1986 amnesty—
and we’re still seeing a lot of effort by those who supported the amnesty to try
and stop the growth of any type of workplace verification system.
And I think Americans are concerned about that as well. I think people, by
and large, distrust the federal government’s willingness to enforce immigration
laws and the idea—I’ve heard it mentioned kind of subtly a couple of times
here that we need another pathway to citizenship for employees who are here
legally. But what would that do? What would that solve? We already know that
if you were to legalize illegal immigrants with promises of future enforcement
or promises of some new type of verification program, it’s going to be another
twenty-five years or so before it ever gets enforced and during that time,
there will be lawsuits to try and prevent it. Some of the groups that have filed
lawsuits against using E-Verify are groups that, years ago, supposedly were in
favor of making sure there was workplace compliance.
So the idea, for us, is that mass legalization, as the Congressman said, was
a failure. We tried it in [19]86. If the goal was to reduce illegal immigration,
clearly it didn’t work. People are suggesting we try it again. It’s not going to
work without enforcement. The other option that we often hear from advocates
of mass legalization is that if we don’t do that, the only other option is mass
deportation. And of course, no one’s calling for mass deportation either.
And that’s why we think the middle ground is the policy of attrition, where
you slowly shrink the illegal immigrant population over time by sending the
message that if you come legally, we’ll help you out. In fact, there should
be a warmer welcome for those who are admitted legally. But if you are not
coming here through proper channels, we’re not going to accommodate you
as easily. You’ll not be able to find a job. And that’s really what we’re talking
about, is the jobs magnet; that’s what encourages illegal immigration. And the
way you turn off that magnet is by requiring businesses to use programs like
E-Verify. Is it 100 percent perfect? Of course not. There aren’t any government
programs that are 100 percent perfect. Is it ready for prime time? I don’t think
the government necessarily thinks it is but we’re certainly getting there. And
as was mentioned, there is the policy of adding photo IDs to E-Verify, which
would reduce the fraud rates that much more. You should know that about
ninety-eight percent of illegal immigrants use a social security number—a
fake ID with their name but a fake number. And E-Verify can catch that very
easily because they’re going to match the name and the number and realize,
“Well, there’s no match here,” or the number is not even legitimate. And that’s
ninety-eight percent of the problem; ninety-eight percent of illegal immigrants
do that. The remainder, of course, are using black market IDs which are very
expensive and very difficult to come across. And for that, the photo ID process,
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if it is attached and if there’s support for it, could certainly rule that out.
But as far as the fallout goes from not doing anything, I mean there’s a very
high cost to cheap labor that I think people tend to forget. We’re talking about
exploitation here. We’re talking about child labor; young kids being worked
many hours at a lot of these meatpacking plants, for example, that were the
focus of ICE raids that we heard about earlier. You can put an end to this if
there’s a serious commitment to workplace enforcement. And so far, I just
don’t think that there is. And I haven’t heard much in the way of solutions
rather than additional legalization programs.
Let me give you one quick example here and I’m going to close. There’s
a company that was the focus of an ICE raid in 2006. It was a meatpacking
company, Swift & Company. We found—this is well-known—that there were
1,300 illegal immigrants who were found to have been working at six different
meat processing plants. I’m not certain if all of them were E-Verify. I know
there’s some claims that they were. We do know that the business owners were
instructing the employees on how to get around the system, where to buy fake
IDs. The business wasn’t trying to uphold the law.
About twenty-three percent of Swift’s production workers were illegal
immigrants. Now government data—and this is just so troubling to me—
government data shows that the average wages of meatpackers in 2007 were
forty-five percent lower than what they were in 1980, and that’s adjusting for
inflation.23 That’s a significant problem and it’s the result of not just porous
borders but a lack of enforcement at the workplace.
Well guess what. After the raid occurred, after the illegal immigrants were
removed from the jobs, people lined up around the corners to take those jobs.
And in fact, we found—or our Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who works
for us found—that wages and bonuses rose, on average, eight percent with the
departure of illegal immigrants. I think that’s a good thing. I don’t know who
can say that it’s not a good thing.
I’ll leave it there.
PETER ASAAD: Thank you so much, Jon Feere, for that perspective as
well. Now Mr. Hampe, you’re a partner of Baker & McKenzie. You represent
clients. You’ve also worked on legislative efforts and you understand the
dynamic of how clients such as the Chamber of Commerce represents many
clients that are against E-Verify and we were talking a little bit about solutions
to the whole problem. How do you see E-Verify? Is it a solution, a solution to
what? Can you put that in your perspective as far as representing clients and
understanding legislation as well?

23. Jerry Kammer, The 2006 Swift Raids: Assessing the Impact of Immigration
Enforcement Actions at Six Facilities (Mar. 2009), http://www.cis.org/2006SwiftRaids.
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CARL HAMPE: Sure. I think the question properly focuses on the point
Bruce Morrison made at the start, which is if you’re serious about having an
immigration system with robust legal immigration numbers that the American
public can support—which there’s sort of mixed support for at the moment—
then you simply do have to address the problem of unauthorized employment.
It’s just a given. So if one is to conclude, as Congress did in 1986, that employers
are the entry point and the incentive, that U.S. employment is the incentive
for people to come here without authorization, in most instances, then what
should employers do; how much should the burden be on employers? And I
think employers have responded by saying, in most instances, they are willing
to take reasonable measures, as long as they are effective. And that’s kind of
the rub.
You will find a diversity of opinion among employers. The Chamber
has opposed the Arizona statute. I think they wouldn’t oppose it under all
circumstances. They’re certainly willing, I understand, to discuss a federal
statute that preempts a patchwork of state statutes and says “Here is the rule,”
as long as the system in place was effective. And I think when you talk about
the large companies that I counsel, that’s really the key. Employers want to
minimize risk in all aspects of what they do so they can go about doing what
they do, which is providing goods, services, and attempting to make a profit.
Immigration is a risk factor to the extent the proposals, such as E-Verify, can
reduce the risk involved in the hiring and employment process; then they’re
positive, as long as the requirements are economically rational.
E-Verify is, to some employers, too much, and to some employers, too little
and it kind of depends on where you sit. Small employers who may rely on,
shall we say, sketchy pools of labor, would probably be uneasy about having
E-Verify required of them. Large employers, particularly those with large
numbers of unskilled workers and especially those that are publicly traded,
have long ago crossed that threshold. They do E-Verify. That’s not going to
change. They read the ICE best practices. They do as many of the additional
best practices that ICE suggests would be undertaken by a compliant employer.
And they are constantly looking for a way to reduce their immigration risk.
Obviously, if you’re a meatpacker or a chicken processor, you’re at very high
risk and so you undertake most, if not all, of the ICE best practices and you
attempt to do it in a way that is compliant with all laws, including the antidiscrimination laws.
So employers are looking for practical solutions. E-Verify is here to stay
without question and, at the same time, it doesn’t resolve enough of the risks
that employers see on all sides of the aisle. Employers don’t want to be raided
by ICE, they don’t want to unfairly deny employment to someone who’s
authorized, they don’t want to be the subject of anti-discrimination suits; they
simply want to go about doing their business. And the immigration system, at
the moment, at the new employment transaction point and thereafter, simply
isn’t sufficient.
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And the debate, the healthy diversity of opinion you’re seeing on this panel
merely indicates how challenging it is for the politicians and policymakers,
to come up with the systems that would make the risk that employers face
in the employment transaction go down. I think employers would like to see
legislation that worked but, of course, that’s the question: can it happen.
PETER ASAAD: Appreciate the perspective very much of the employer.
Now sliding over to Professor Vladeck, you’re a professor who understands
federal jurisdiction and constitutional law. If you would, what you think will
happen in the Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting case. Now the District Court
sided with the Arizona workers; so did the Ninth Circuit. And there have been
oral arguments and there’ve been some comments based on the oral argument
questioning from the justices. Where do you see it going and what do you see
the consequences being?
PROFESSOR VLADECK: Well, I guess I should preface it by saying
I hate guessing how the Supreme Court is going to rule because I’m either
wrong or I’m right for the wrong reasons. No one actually knows.
That being said, I think one can read your argument here, I think somewhat
reliably, to suggest that the Court’s inclined to affirm the Ninth Circuit and to
thereby hold that IRCA does not preempt the Legal Arizona Workers Act, but
Arizona mandating E-Verify actually is permissible.
What I think is going to be interesting is not what the result is, but how the
Court writes that opinion. Because I think there are a couple of different ways
they can go and how they do it will have, I think, far greater consequences than
[merely just affirming].
So let me just sort of briefly elaborate and then throw it back to some of you.
The only legal question is what IRCA means when it exempts state laws related
to licensing or other similar laws from its expressed preemption provision. So
this is not, for example, like the SB 1070 case24 where the preemption is based
on a sort of more general, and less textual, conflict between state and federal
law. Here you actually have a case of expressed preemption or not, depending
upon whether the Legal Arizona Workers Act is, or is not, a licensing law. And
indeed, most of the oral argument was about that very question: is it a licensing
law.
And what the Justices really struggled with was the notion that they could
really tell Arizona that by saying, “We will revoke business licenses if you fail
to comply with E-Verify,” that that somehow wasn’t a licensing law. It may be
a sort of troubling licensing law, it may be a licensing law that we might not
have enacted, but it’s about licenses.
Now the argument that Carter Phillips made on behalf of the Chamber of
24. S.B. 1070, 49th Legis., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
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Commerce is that licensing law means, more specifically, laws that go to the
conferral on a license and not just the revocation of a license. I don’t think it
strains credulity to suggest that that’s a thin reed on which to rest this entire
case, and I think some of the Justices’ questions went in that direction.
So I think one way out is for the Court to just hold narrowly that, because
the Arizona law specifically imputes, as the sanction, that a business license
is revoked—clearly a licensing law within the meaning of 1324a(h)(2)25—we
don’t have to decide anything else.
What’s really interesting, though, is throughout the oral argument, on both
sides—well, three sides because the federal government argued, too—Justice
Scalia kept coming back to this notion that the rules might be different when
you have federal policy that is underenforced by the executive branch. And I
have to say, I can’t think he means it. And the reason why is because if you
guys remember [ ], it was Justice Scalia writing for the Supreme Court who
basically said, “Article II of the Constitution protects the executive’s discretion
to enforce federal law.” And so, just as Congress cannot command how the
president exercises his discretion, nor can Congress make an end run around
that by enlisting the states in requiring the enforcement of certain federal laws.
If that logic makes any sense, then it should also hold for states; that
states cannot tie the hands of the federal Executive. In other words, underenforcement, although problematic as a policy matter, has no actual bearing on
the constitutional analysis; it has no actual bearing on the preemption analysis.
I think that has to be right. And so that’s why I think we’re likely to see an
opinion that sort of ducks the underenforcement question, saves it for SB 1070
and really just sort of construes the statute as narrowly as possible because
Arizona did, really, what so few of the states have done, which is—at least in
this statute’s context—rely specifically on the licensing concept.
If that’s what the Court holds, and I think it is, it’ll be overnight that I think
we’ll see more and more states moving toward imposing certain kinds of
sanctions on employers in the guise of licensing practices. And I think the
question is going to be whether the Supreme Court says the sanction has to
be in some way related to the ability of the business to function, which I think
would still get you the Arizona law but which would not get you anything
about immigration in the guise of business licenses.
So I think that’s where we’ll see how it cashes out. But if I were a betting
man, I think it’s likely that the Arizona law is going to be upheld.
PETER ASAAD: Thank you so much. So it seems, Congressman Morrison,
was onto something when he actually said that it was well-crafted and wellwritten. And Professor Vladeck, who says, “Let’s look at how it’s written.
Let’s look at how the whole thing is going to be written, how narrow will it
be.” But we could end up then, in fact, with a template, if you will, for other
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (making employment of unauthorized noncitizens
unlawful).
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states and localities to pass successful legislation.
CONGRESSMAN MORRISON: And indeed, that may in itself provide it
if it’s just [for Congress to revisit the issue].
CARL HAMPE: Yes. Actually, I was just going to say that. Bruce, maybe
you’d agree that if the Supreme Court said, “OK, the Arizona statute is fine,”
ten other states rush to present those bills to their legislatures, that might
bring the Chamber and other groups aligned with them back to the Hill to say,
“Alright, let’s preempt this once and for all,” and then the question would be,
“OK, under what standards?” Because that kind of opens up the whole basis
upon which one has an E-Verify program.
CONGRESSMAN MORRISON: That would seem to make sense but I
spent four years making that argument on behalf of the Society for Human
Resources Management that this—I mean I said then, and it proved out, that
the Arizona law was going to be upheld because of the narrow tailoring of the
language. Nobody wanted to hear it at the time. Now I guess it’s conventional
wisdom.
But the fact is that NumbersUSA—to take one organization, for instance
—actually has built its grassroots base on advocating state laws and they’re
going to get a big boost out of this case if it goes the way Professor Vladeck
suggests and they’re going to do a lot of organizing, they’re going to get a lot
of members off of it. And it’s not entirely clear that the Republican majority
in the House will want to fix the problem once the states have the authority
to “fix the problem.” Because the state solution seems to be much easier to
achieve than the federal one and doesn’t come with any legalization baggage,
for instance. So it might play out quite the other way from what Carl suggests.
PROFESSOR VLADECK: It doesn’t come with legalization baggage. It
does come with litigation baggage. Because I think the real issue is the Arizona
law is about as close to a pure licensing requirement as I think you could get
without the added piece of actually being necessary to obtain a license versus
revoking a license. The question is going to be, when states start going further
afield . . .
PETER ASAAD: Alright, thank you so much to our panelists for all their
time. And thank you.
END TRANSCRIPT

